European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement in Ghana:Introducing needed change or reinforcing business as usual? by Hansen, Christian Pilegaard et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary
Partnership Agreement in Ghana
Hansen, Christian Pilegaard; Rutt, Rebecca Leigh; Acheampong, Emmanuel
Published in:
Policy Briefs (Copenhagen Centre for Development Research)
Publication date:
2018
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Hansen, C. P., Rutt, R. L., & Acheampong, E. (2018). European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance
and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement in Ghana: Introducing needed change or reinforcing
business as usual? Policy Briefs (Copenhagen Centre for Development Research), 2018(03).
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
N O .  0 3  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 8
P O L I C Y  B R I E F S  •  C O P E N H A G E N  C E N T R E  F O R  D E V E L O P M E N T  R E S E A R C H
European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
in Ghana: Introducing needed change or reinforcing 
business as usual?
Introduction
The European Union (EU)’s Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
Action Plan is a forest conservation and 
development intervention that has raised great 
expectations in many countries since its 
enactment in 2003. FLEGT symbolizes the EU’s 
assumed responsibility to tackle illegal logging and 
trade of illegally harvested timber products. A key 
element of the FLEGT Action Plan is the 
negotiation of bilateral Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPAs) between the EU and tropical 
timber producing countries. Aimed at supporting 
partner countries to stop illegal logging by im-
proving forest governance and regulation, the VPA 
process clarifies the definition of legal timber in 
the country of origin, and outlines a Timber 
Legality Assurance System to verify and certify 
legality. A joint committee with EU and partner 
country representatives (government agencies, civil 
society, and private sector) oversees and reviews 
the implementation of the agreement. Currently, 
seven countries - Ghana, Cameroon, Republic of 
Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam - have entered VPAs with 
the EU.
The VPA processes are receiving praise from FLEGT 
practitioners as well as some international and 
domestic civil society and international scholars. 
But an emerging body of research is also shedding 
light on a range of unintended and 
Logs en route to sawmill. Photo: Jens Friis Lund 
un-acknowledged outcomes of VPAs and in 
general, casting doubts on their efficacy against 
deeply entrenched interests and practices.
This policy brief takes a closer look at Ghana, 
considered a VPA frontrunner, to qualify the 
largely positive depiction painted of VPA 
processes. Drawing from a recent publication by 
Hansen, Rutt, and Acheampong (2018) and its 
review of the rich literature on forest governance 
as well as 160 semi-structured interviews with 
relevant actors in the country, we pose critical 
policy recommendations to move beyond business 
as usual in Ghanaian forest governance (as well 
as development interventions there), and toward 
more transformative change.
VPA in Ghana: the positive narrative
Beeko and Arts (2010: 221) assert “…that the 
national forest discourse of Ghana has been re-
shaped by the VPA process, that the 
traditional forest sector has been opened up, that 
new forest rules have been designed and that 
power relations have changed in favor of so-called 
fringe actors”. This echoes the assessment of 
Ozinga and Leal (2010: 1) who found “the mul-
ti- stakeholder consultation process worked well” 
and that “the Ghana-EU VPA was signed (…) with 
the consent of all stakeholders”. It also echoes 
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2016; 2018) who find that 
the VPA implementation in Ghana: (i) is providing 
an effective platform for NGOs and other 
domestic stakeholders to raise problems; (ii) the 
FLEGT Joint Monitoring and Review Mechanism 
has been a crucial platform for accountability, 
learning, and recursive problem-solving; (iii) the 
timber tracking system developed as part of 
the VPA implementation has made a significant 
contribution to sustainable forest management 
practices; (iv) resulting in more strict enforcement 
of Social Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) which 
thereby has made a significant contribution to-
wards equitable benefit sharing; and (v) that major 
policy reforms have addressed domestic market 
issues, notably a public procurement policy and an 
artisanal milling strategy. Overall, they conclude: 
“The VPA implementation process has proven a 
remarkably incisive framework for exposing such 
issues layer by layer, identifying their root causes, 
and thrashing out mutually acceptable solutions 
through iterated deliberations among local stake-
holders, supported by the EU” (Overdevest and 
Zeitlin, 2016: 61). 
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A qualifying analysis with a 
historical perspective
Paying close attention to the history of forest 
governance in Ghana, we take a critical look at 
the positive interpretations of the VPA process 
presented above, and discuss the implications for 
sustainable and equitable forest management in 
the country. 
VPAs: A step toward sustainable forest 
management? 
VPA implementation has supposedly resulted in 
progress on at least three aspects of sustainable 
forest management: the development of a Timber 
Legality Assurance System, the revision of forest 
management plans, and the elaboration of digital 
stock maps. We look at these three developments 
in turn:
 Firstly, the Timber Legality Assurance 
System, which should entail electronic and 
real-time tracking of all raw and processed timber 
from the forest to the end user on the domestic 
market or export point, will in practice largely fail 
to engage meaningfully with the majority of the 
production for the domestic market. This is 
because, under Ghana’s current legal framework, 
the vast majority of domestic production is 
considered illegal and out of reach of the Timber 
Legality Assurance System. 
 Secondly, many of the revised forest 
management plans rely on outdated inventory 
data and appear mainly as deskwork; most of 
the text is generic and general, not specific to the 
forest reserve in question. 
 Thirdly, the introduction of digital stock 
maps - a product of the Timber Legality Assurance 
System - will surely make the allocation of yield 
(the selection of trees that can be felled in the 
compartment) cheaper and faster as compared to 
the paper-based system. Yet, digital stock maps 
do not redress the fundamental challenges 
related to calculation of a sustainable harvest level, 
because the procedures (rules) that are used to 
calculate the harvest level have lost their validity. 
Does the VPA support equitable benefit 
sharing?
Under current Ghanaian law, the state holds the 
right to grant concessions for native timber grown 
in forest reserves as well as on farmlands, outside 
  
For substantive change in the Ghanaian forestry sector toward sustainability, equity, and eventually legality, 
we suggest that the stakeholder dialogue and policy discussion focus on the following issues: 
On-farm trees:
1. Legal reforms that provide farmers formal rights, including rights to retain, harvest, and sell for profit, trees they 
nurture on their farms. This is critical to resolving many challenges of the domestic market, and entails an end to all 
on-farm forest concessions. Measures are also required to ensure that farmers can benefit from those rights, 
e.g. assistance in marketing and tree growers’ associations. 
2. The abolishment of the Timber Legality Assurance System for on-farm timber. Rather, a simpler ‘proof of origin’ 
labelling scheme that distinguishes on-farm from forest reserve timber must be developed.
Forest reserves:
3. A full assessment of forest reserves and a revised paradigm for determining where logging may still be an option 
and under what conditions, intensity, and frequency. 
4. Substantive revision of forest reserve management plans that, through meaningful engagement of communities, 
better reflect situated needs and interests rather than promoting uniform models oriented toward only a few 
products (timber).  
5. An updated forest taxation regime that captures the true resource value; revision of (stumpage fee revenue) benefit 
distribution practices to reflect conservation and livelihood needs.
 
We are not suggesting that this would be an easy transition, neither to agree on, nor to implement, but these issues 
must be at the core of any meaningful forest governance reform discussion.
Policy Recommendations
of forest reserves. Farmers and rural dwellers have 
no rights to the revenue from the harvest. Instead, 
farmers may claim (tokenistic) compensation for 
damages to their crops resulting from on-farm 
timber logging.  In addition, Social Responsibility 
Agreements (SRAs) must be established between 
timber operators (concession and permit holders) 
and local communities that outline the provision 
of benefits by operators to the local community. 
While VPA implementation has resulted in in-
creased attention to and strengthening of SRA 
procedures, the SRAs themselves are ruled by a 
taxation regime that largely siphons benefits away 
from communities toward other actors. The value 
of the SRAs is by regulation stipulated to be maxi-
mum 5% of the stumpage fee revenue. The latter 
fee, paid by the timber contractors, is very low 
compared to the value of the timber harvested 
because it has not been updated as stipulated in 
the regulation. So the value of the SRAs 
constitutes an extremely low share of the timber 
value, and can hardly be considered as substantial 
contributions to equity. Worse, they also legitimize 
and stabilize a forest governance regime that is 
widely viewed by Ghanaian stakeholders, not least 
those with on-farm timber, as deeply unfair.
Does the VPA tackle domestic market 
issues and the informal sector?
The domestic market is key to any efforts to 
address governance and sustainability in Ghana. 
The timber harvest to supply the domestic market 
is likely to be twice the export harvest, and 
“chainsaw operators” who are considered illegal 
under current law cover 85% of the domestic 
harvest. Some argue that VPA implementation has 
effectively tackled domestic market dilemmas 
thanks to two developments: a public timber 
procurement policy and an artisanal milling 
strategy. Yet, while a public timber procurement 
draft policy was prepared, it has never been 
promulgated and so is not being implemented. 
The artisanal milling strategy stipulates that the 
informal operators that currently supply the 
domestic market, the chainsaw operators, should 
receive support, training, tools and permits to 
legally supply the domestic market. This timber is 
to be sourced from off-cuts and low value timber 
rejected by concessionaires. Yet, such sources will 
only be able to supply a fraction of the 
domestic demand. And if artisanal millers gain 
permits, it will eat into the standing timber 
available to current concession holders, raising 
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new questions and challenges in this zero-sum 
game. It appears, strangely, that the artisanal 
milling strategy assumes an endless resource 
availability that is defied by current conditions. 
Most importantly, the focus on public 
procurement and artisanal milling reveals the lack 
of a realistic discussion of forest and tree 
tenure reform within the VPA. The VPA agreement 
(Annex II) refers to legislative reform aspirations 
including of forest tenure and rights, but without 
any specifics. We suggest that if the VPA is fully 
implemented in its current form, existing 
marginalization will be exacerbated. 
The VPA as an effective platform for 
information sharing and policy debate?
Interviews with representatives of NGOs involved 
in VPA negotiations suggest the process has been 
unique from a historical perspective, and praise 
the VPA for embracing difficult conversations to 
identify meaningful solutions. However, our 
interviews also reveal that actors in the timber 
industry and communities generally feel excluded 
from the VPA process.
This is not in any way to discount the efforts of 
those facilitating the VPA process in Ghana to 
engage diverse stakeholders. We agree that in
a historical perspective the process has been 
unprecedented. Nonetheless, it does show that it 
is a tremendous task to involve all stakeholders, 
even with the best of intentions. It also reaffirms 
the wellknown difficulties of engaging more 
vulnerable (e.g. community) and less powerful 
(e.g. small-scale enterprise) stakeholders.
Are the joint monitoring and review 
mechanisms promoting accountability, 
learning and problem solving? 
The VPA also entails a FLEGT Joint Monitoring and 
Review Mechanism (JMRM) committee that brings 
together representatives of public sector, civil 
society, private sector, and the EU. 
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2018: 4) praise the Ghana 
JMRM committee platform for allowing civil 
society “to raise forest governance concerns in the 
presence of the EU delegation, thereby putting 
pressure on the Ghanaian authorities to address 
them.” While the committee may be a step 
forward, we contend – as the present brief 
illustrates - that the most critical and thorny 
political issues are yet to be addressed.
Conclusion
While we agree that the VPA has helped 
establish new fora for dialogue in the forest sector 
in Ghana, we argue that it has not to date 
fundamentally changed the forest governance 
regime. Specifically, the VPA implementation has 
not changed tree tenure and benefit sharing 
practices, and by extension, the forestry 
concession system that for over eight decades 
has failed to secure forest sustainability and social 
equity. Our evidence contradicts depictions of 
Ghana’s VPA experience as wholly positive and 
entailing substantive dialogue, recursive 
problem solving, and policy learning. 
Rather, and paradoxically, we argue that the VPA 
implementation in Ghana is serving to stabilize 
and reproduce the very forest governance regime 
that it set out to reform – a process that is much 
less innovative and much more business as usual.
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